



**SOCIAL PROTECTION  
AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES**

***FAIRWORK  
JORDAN  
RATINGS  
2025***



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## THE FAIRWORK PROJECT

### Executive Summary

Following a first assessment in 2023, this Fairwork Jordan report evaluates the working conditions of seven digital labour platforms in Jordan; these are the ride-hailing platforms Careem, Taxi-F, Petra Ride, Jeeny, Uber and the delivery platforms Careem Box and Talabat.


While ride-hailing platforms started to appear already in 2015 in Jordan, it took nearly three years for the sector to be regulated. In the beginning, around 13,000 workers and seven ride-hailing platforms received licenses to operate in Jordan. Currently, in 2025, this number stands at 11,045 workers distributed over four licensed platforms. However, unlicensed platforms still operate in Jordan, with an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 workers. In this report, we particularly looked at the regulatory pressure workers experience in the ride-hailing economy and how this subsequently affects their working conditions. Addressing the various risks workers are exposed to, this report aims to encourage more equitable practices and working conditions for platform workers.

The study evaluates the platforms against five principles of Fairwork. These are fair pay, fair conditions, fair contracts, fair management, and fair representation, with two points awarded under each principle. A thorough desk review and interviews with platform workers and managers were used as evidence in the scoring process. The scores were then validated by peer researchers of the international Fairwork network.

Nearly no points were awarded to the platforms we evaluated this year. None of the platforms were able to demonstrate a guaranteed minimum wage for their workers, mainly due to the high work-associated costs. We could not find evidence that workers are protected against occupational safety risks; instead we found evidence that they have to bear work-related risks themselves, as defined by their contracts. We found no evidence that communication and appeal processes are standardised, and platforms fall short in recognising workers' collective voice. The only points awarded were for two platforms, Petra Ride and Jeeny (both more localised platforms), for threshold 3.1. We found evidence that they adhere to local legal frameworks (principle 3.1), allowing workers to seek legal redress in Jordan and providing them with clear and transparent contracts.

# SCORES

## FAIRWORK Jordan Scores 2025



The breakdown of scores for individual platforms is available at:  
**FAIR.WORK/JORDAN**



# KEY FINDINGS



## FAIR PAY

None of the platforms could evidence that they ensure that workers receive at least the local minimum wage. Neither could they show that they guarantee that workers' net income reaches the threshold of JOD 1.40 (USD 1.97) per hour, due to the high associated costs of platform work. Expenses may represent up to 50 to 100 per cent of a worker's income, including the platform's commission fee, licensing costs, fuel, repair, internet, fines, and vehicle loans with the bank. In selected cases, the workers we spoke to reported negative wages, meaning the costs outweigh their earnings. Subsequently, we found no evidence that any of the seven platforms we evaluated meet the threshold of 1.2 to provide a local living wage.




## FAIR CONDITIONS

We found no evidence that platforms meet the threshold to mitigate task specific risks, and we also found no evidence that platforms meet the threshold for ensuring safer working conditions and a social safety net. This means that workers have to bear the risks for work-related health and safety issues. Additionally, we found no evidence that workers across the seven platforms are entitled to social security.



## FAIR CONTRACTS

Only two platforms met the threshold of providing clear and transparent terms and conditions. Petra Ride and Jeeny were awarded the first point under this principle for providing contracts that are accessible and subject to the local law. None of the platforms scored the second point under this principle. We could not find evidence that the platforms evaluated don't impose unfair working conditions through their terms and conditions, such as by not notifying workers in advance of changes and risks, and putting the liability solely on the workers.



## FAIR MANAGEMENT

None of the platforms were awarded points for this principle. Platforms could not show that they have clear communication channels with timely processing, nor documented processes to appeal unjustified blocks, ratings, or the like. Further, we found evidence that workers from Careem, Careem Box, Jeeny, and Uber are discriminated against on the basis of their vehicle type, conflicting with the second point regarding equity in the management process.



## FAIR REPRESENTATION

Limited as they are by Jordan's legal framework, platform workers can't collectively express their voice and advocate for their rights. We didn't find any evidence that platforms recognise or acknowledge informal workers' representatives.



## EDITORIAL

# Regulating Ride-Hailing

Similarly to the 2023 evaluation, the Fairwork Jordan team examined the ride-hailing and delivery sector in Jordan, but focused mainly on ride-hailing. Ride-hailing is the dominant form of digitally facilitated labour in Jordan, and regulations for the ride-hailing sector are more extensive than for delivery platforms.

Recent amendments, approved in 2025, to the Smart Ride-Hailing Regulation lay the groundwork for improved wages for self-employed workers on ride-hailing platforms in Jordan. It requires companies to provide clear bases for wages and commissions, to be approved by the authorities. This is a first step towards price monitoring, holding the potential to hold companies accountable for paying fair wages.

A social safety net for platform workers, particularly social security and health insurance, will likely remain an issue. Due to their classification as freelancers or service providers, platform companies are not required to enrol their workers in social security schemes. Additionally, workers from poorer backgrounds are especially vulnerable, as their vehicle ownership disqualifies them from supplementary governmental schemes like the poor people's health insurance. Occupational safety and health, on the other hand, can be expected to improve with the amended regulations and their compliance standards. It requires platform companies to equip vehicles with self-monitoring systems to ensure service quality and the safety of service providers and passengers.

The new amendment also aims at facilitating the licensing of new platforms, giving a chance to currently unlicensed platforms to start operating legally. However, platforms retain full control over the terms of employment and are not obliged to issue contracts under local law, which raises questions about how this affects workers' access to legal redress.



Most of the workers we interviewed for this study multi-app; that is, they operate on multiple apps simultaneously to avoid waiting times between gigs. However, workers acquire their operational license either with Uber or Careem, as the only premium platforms. Workers can get access to working on additional platforms by paying an additional fee. This means that without having already obtained a license with a premium platform, the captains, as workers on ride-hailing apps are called, can't work on a secondary platform. Additionally, if workers receive a (temporary) block or suspension from their main platform, they can't work on their secondary platforms. To reduce workers' dependency on the main platform, workers would prefer a license that is tied to them as operators. However, without formal channels for dialogue between workers and the authorities, and many workers expressing that they feel unheard, it remains unclear if a change in licensing structure will materialise.

**Lastly, it is expected that drivers will continue working without any formal labour union representing them. This is detrimental to their working conditions, as they lack channels and processes to collectively express their voice and demands.**

## THE FAIRWORK PROJECT

# Towards Fair Labour Standards in the Platform Economy

**Fairwork evaluates and ranks the working conditions of digital platforms. Our ratings are based on five principles that digital labour platforms should ensure in order to be considered to be offering basic minimum standards of fairness. We evaluate platforms annually against these principles to show not only what the platform economy is today, but also what it can be.**

The Fairwork ratings provide an independent perspective on labour conditions of platform work for policymakers, platform companies, workers, and consumers. Our goal is to show that better, fairer, jobs are possible in the platform economy. The Fairwork project is coordinated by the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, and the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. Our network of researchers has rated platforms in 41 countries across five continents. In every country, Fairwork collaborates closely with workers, platforms, advocates and policymakers to promote a fairer future of platform work. In Jordan, this research is led by researchers at the Phenix Center for Economics & Informatics Studies.



## FAIRWORK COUNTRIES




Figure 1: Map of Fairwork countries

### AFRICA:

Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda

### ASIA:

Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam

### EUROPE:

Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Poland, Serbia, Spain, UK

### SOUTH AMERICA:

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay

### NORTH AMERICA:

Mexico, USA

## THE FAIRWORK FRAMEWORK

Fairwork evaluates the working conditions of digital labour platforms and ranks them on how well they do. To do this, we use five principles that digital labour platforms should ensure to be considered as offering ‘fair work’. The five Fairwork principles were developed through a multi-stakeholder workshop at the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and many more workshops in various countries. In the years since then, the principles and their operationalisation have been further fine-tuned. Further details on the thresholds for each principle, and the criteria used to assess the collected evidence to score platforms, can be found in the Appendix.

It is worth noting that the Fairwork principles were updated in 2024 through the collaboration of teams from participating countries. To ensure that these global principles were applicable in the context of Jordan, we have subsequently revised and fine-tuned them in consultation with platform workers, platforms, trade unions, regulators, academics, and labour lawyers.

### Step 1: The five principles

#### Fair Pay

Workers, irrespective of their employment classification, should earn a fair income in their home jurisdiction after taking account of work-related costs. We assess earnings according to the mandated minimum wage in the home jurisdiction, as well as the current living wage.

#### Fair Conditions

Platforms should have policies in place to protect workers from foundational risks arising from the processes of work and should take proactive measures to protect and promote the health and safety of workers.

#### Fair Contracts

Terms and conditions should be accessible, readable and comprehensible. The party contracting with the worker must be subject to local law and must be identified in the contract. Regardless of the workers’ employment status, the contract should be free of clauses which unreasonably exclude liability on the part of the service user and/ or the platform.

## Fair Management

There should be a documented process through which workers can be heard, can appeal decisions affecting them, and be informed of the reasons behind those decisions. There must be a clear channel of communication to workers involving the ability to appeal management decisions or deactivation. The use of algorithms should be transparent and result in equitable outcomes for workers. There should be an identifiable and documented policy that ensures equity in the way workers are managed on a platform (for example, in the hiring, disciplining, or firing of workers).

## Fair Representation

Platforms should provide a documented process through which worker voice can be expressed. Irrespective of their employment classification, workers should have the right to organise in collective bodies, and platforms should be prepared to cooperate and negotiate with them.



## Step 2: Methodology

**The Fairwork project uses three approaches to effectively measure fairness of working conditions on digital labour platforms: desk research, approaching platforms for evidence, and worker interviews. Through these three methods, we seek evidence on whether platforms operate in accordance with the five Fairwork Principles.**

### Desk research

Each annual Fairwork ratings cycle starts with desk research to map the range of platforms to be scored, identify points of contact with management, develop suitable interview guides and survey instruments, and design recruitment strategies to access workers. For each platform, we gather and analyse a wide range of publicly available documents including contracts, terms and conditions, published policies and procedures, as well as digital interfaces.

Desk research also flags any publicly available information that could assist us in scoring different platforms: for instance, the provision of particular services to workers, or the existence of past or ongoing disputes. Once the list of platforms has been finalised, each platform is invited to participate in Fairwork's annual ranking study and provided with information about the process.

### Platform evidence

The second method involves approaching platforms for evidence. Platform management is invited to submit evidence and discuss the platform's degree of compliance with each of the Fairwork principles. Evidence may include published policies and/or standard operating procedures, public commitments, and website/app functionality. This evidence provides insights into the operation and business model of the platform, while also opening up a dialogue through which the platform could agree to implement changes based on the principles. In cases where platform managements do not agree to participate in the research, we limit our scoring to evidence obtained through desk research and worker interviews.

### Worker interviews

The third method is interviewing platform workers and their representatives directly. These interviews do not aim to be a statistically representative set of experiences. Rather, they are worker case-studies to examine platforms' policies and practices in the field as they pertain to the Fairwork principles. Specifically, they seek to gain insight into how work is carried out, and how work processes are managed and experienced, on platforms. The interviews situate platform work in the careers of workers by understanding their motivation for entry into a platform, how long they envision undertaking work on the current platform before seeking an alternative either on another platform or in a different sector, and how their experience of platform work is shaped by their interaction with fellow workers and the external labour market. These interviews also enable Fairwork researchers to see copies of



the contracts issued to workers and to access the app interface, including payout and support screens. This method alerts the team to the presence of issues, but not the frequency or likelihood of their occurrence.

The worker interviews are semi-structured and make use of a series of questions relating to the 10 Fairwork thresholds. In order to qualify for the interviews, workers have to be over the age of 18 and have worked with the platform for at least three months. For this report, the interviews were conducted in Arabic. In this round, 61 interviews were conducted in person, in Amman.

### Putting it all together

This threefold approach provides a way to cross-check the claims made by platforms, while also providing the opportunity to collect evidence from multiple sources. Final scores are collectively decided by the Fairwork team based on all three forms of evidence. Points are only awarded if sufficient evidence exists on each threshold.

## Step 3: How we score

Each of the five Fairwork principles is broken down into two points: a first point, and a second point that can only be awarded if the first point has been fulfilled. Every platform receives a score out of 10. Platforms are only given a point when they can satisfactorily demonstrate their implementation of the principles. Failing to achieve a point does not necessarily mean that a platform does not comply with the principle in question. It simply means that we are unable to evidence its compliance. The scoring involves a series of stages. First, the in-country team collates the evidence and assigns preliminary scores. The collated evidence is then sent to external reviewers for independent scoring. These reviewers are both members of the Fairwork teams in other countries, as well as members of the central Fairwork team. Once the external reviewers have assigned their scores, all reviewers meet to discuss the scores and decide the final scoring. Platforms are given the opportunity to submit further evidence to earn points that they were initially not awarded. These scores then form the final annual scoring that is published in the annual country Fairwork report. Before the publication of this report, companies rated were given the opportunity to review and comment on the findings of this report. All responses are included in Appendix II.



## Country Context

# Jordan's Labour Market

**Jordan continues to face numerous challenges, most notably the persistent sluggishness in economic growth, which was recorded at 2.7% in the fourth quarter of 2024.<sup>1</sup> For the past 15 years, annual growth rates have remained stagnant, fluctuating between 2% and 2.5%, and at best, approaching 3%.**

In addition, unemployment rates remain exceptionally high—both by historical Jordanian standards and in comparison to global averages. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the unemployment rate stood at 19.2%, rising to 21.3%<sup>2</sup> in the first quarter of 2025.

These concerning indicators are further exacerbated by low wage levels and delayed wage adjustments. The minimum wage in Jordan currently stands at 290 Jordanian dinars (approximately 400 USD), while inflation rates—reflected in rising prices of goods and services—continue to climb. The inflation rate for the first five months of 2025 increased by 1.97%<sup>3</sup> compared to the same period in 2024.

As a result of these trends—particularly high unemployment and the rising cost of living—many individuals have turned to informal and freelance work as a means of survival. These types of work are unregulated and lack any form of social protection. According to statements made by the Director General of the Social Security Corporation last year<sup>4</sup> and reports from the World Bank,<sup>5</sup> 59% of workers in Jordan are informally employed. Most of them earn low incomes and are in urgent need of social protection.

In this context, freelance and temporary work has, over the past few years, become a new reality shaping labour markets across much of the world, especially with the rapid rise of digital platforms.

While such forms of work have provided employment opportunities for large segments of unemployed youth and those seeking supplemental income—especially amid high unemployment and low wages—many of these workers face significant challenges. These include a lack of social protections such as social security, imbalanced labour relations, and other structural vulnerabilities. These issues largely stem from weak regulatory frameworks—whether in the form of laws, regulations, or directives—and the failure to enforce labour and social security laws on this broad and growing segment of the workforce.<sup>6</sup>

## The Platform Economy in Jordan

The platform economy in Jordan has expanded rapidly over the past decade due to several factors. Chief among them is the country's broader economic situation, characterised by high population growth driven by domestic demographic trends as well as waves of refugees and migration from neighbouring countries. Coupled with this, the slowdown in economic growth over the past ten years has resulted in insufficient job creation for the growing population. Within this context, platforms—particularly ride-hailing platforms—began to spread quickly between 2015 and 2018 in Jordan as a response to citizens' increasing need for employment opportunities and additional sources of income. Thousands of individuals turned to work on these platforms, especially given that platform work does not require academic qualifications or professional experience. Instead, to be eligible, workers need only possess a valid driver's license, a vehicle registration, a medical clearance certificate from the Ministry of Health, and a non-criminal record certificate.

Following the formal licensing of ride-hailing platforms, approximately 13,000 drivers received permits to work through these platforms, which represents the cap set by the Land Transport Regulatory Commission (LTRC) for the total number of authorised platform drivers. The government also established a five-year operational age limit for vehicles used on these platforms, later extended to seven years in 2022. Over time, new ride-hailing platforms entered the market, bringing the total number of licensed platforms to seven—all sharing the same ceiling of 13,000 work permits. Uber and Careem dominate the sector, each holding 5,750 driver permits.



## Background

### The Size of Jordan's Platform Economy

Although precise statistics on the number of male and female workers engaged in digital platform work in Jordan are not available, some figures provided by various entities offer a general indication of the sector's size. According to 2023 estimates by the Ministry of Digital Economy, approximately 25,000 individuals are employed through food delivery platforms. Meanwhile, the number of workers in licensed ride-hailing platforms declined to around 11,045 in the second quarter of 2025, with the majority working across four licensed platforms.<sup>8</sup> In late 2024, workers were spread over all seven licensed platforms.<sup>9</sup> According to the Director of the Land Transport Regulatory Authority, the number of drivers working for unlicensed platforms is estimated to be around 40,000 to 50,000.<sup>10</sup> Out of the evaluated platforms in this report, only Taxi-F is unlicensed.

### Working Conditions

Concerning the working conditions of drivers on ride-hailing platforms, various reports indicate that workers face multiple challenges. In terms of income, earnings vary depending on several factors—most notably, the number of hours worked, peak and off-peak periods (such as school and university commuting hours), and other variables such as the high commissions deducted by some platforms, which sometimes exceed 30% of drivers' trip fares.<sup>11</sup> Drivers also face considerable operational expenses, including fuel, work permit fees required by the Land Transport Regulatory Commission (LTRC), regular vehicle maintenance, and delays in receiving payments through credit card systems.

Contracts between drivers of ride-hailing and delivery platforms and platform companies are often described as "adhesion contracts." Subsequently, platform workers are not governed by the labour law, and terms of use and operational conditions are set unilaterally by the platforms. Workers are classified as service providers, by both companies and the law, rather than employees, excluding them from social security. Consequently, registering workers with the Social Security Corporation is not mandatory for platforms, compared to full-time employees. A spokesperson from the Ministry of Labour clarified that flexible or contractual work arrangements do not fall under the Labour Law due to the absence of subordination, supervision, and fixed wages.<sup>12</sup> As a result, the only option for drivers to access social security is through voluntary enrollment. However, many workers reject this option due to its high cost.



Occupational safety and health measures are largely absent. In the Fairwork Jordan Report 2023,<sup>13</sup> we found that drivers were frequently exposed to assaults, violence, and theft by customers, with no protective mechanisms offered by the platforms. Job security is also lacking, as some platforms suspend driver accounts without clear justification and without coordination with the relevant regulatory authorities (the LTRC and the TRC). For women, the nature of the work, particularly the face-to-face interactions with customers, creates a sense of insecurity, discouraging their participation in the sector.<sup>14</sup>

Due to these numerous challenges, ride-hailing drivers, have put forward a set of demands they believe would improve their working environment. These include<sup>15</sup>:

- Restructuring the relationship between drivers and platform companies in a way that protects the interests of both parties and prevents exploitation;
- Reducing and standardizing platform commissions deducted from trip fares;
- Lowering the annual work permit fee from JOD 400 (USD 564) to JOD 200 (USD 282);
- Increasing the operational age limit for vehicles from 7 to 10 years, to allow drivers more time to pay off vehicle loans.

Drivers demand that the permit ownership should be transferred to the drivers, given that they are the ones paying the JOD 400 (USD 564) annual fee. This would grant them the freedom to choose the platform on which they work. Currently, the market is dominated by just two companies, Uber and Careem, and the permit must be issued under one of them for drivers to be allowed to operate on licensed platforms. Consequently, workers who are blocked from their main platform are unable to work for their secondary licensed platform. Lastly, drivers are calling for the licensing of additional ride-hailing platforms to enhance competition among licensed companies. They argue that greater competition between companies would lead to more options for drivers, ultimately increasing their income.<sup>16</sup>



## Legal Framework

# Initial Regulation of the Sector

When ride-hailing platforms first began operating in Jordan in 2015, drivers working through these platforms were not required to obtain official licenses from the government. This created an environment of unfair competition with yellow taxi drivers, who were subject to annual licensing procedures and associated costs. However, in 2018, the “Regulation for the Organization of Passenger Transport Using Smart Applications”<sup>17</sup> was published in the Official Gazette, formally prohibiting operation in this sector without prior licensing and permits, and placing such platforms under the supervision of the Land Transport Regulatory Commission (LTRC), operating under the umbrella of the Ministry of Transport.

At that time, seven ride-hailing platform companies were granted licenses; only four of those are currently operating. The LTRC capped the number of licensed ride-hailing drivers at 13,000.<sup>18 19</sup> At the same time, approximately 30 unlicensed platforms operated in the country. In March 2024, the Ministry of Digital Economy announced<sup>20</sup> that it had blocked 24 unlicensed platforms in cooperation with the Ministry of Transport, the LTRC, the TRC, and the Public Security Directorate. These platforms were removed from app stores through collaboration with major tech companies including Apple, Google, and Huawei. According to the ministry, this step was taken due to the unfair competition posed by unlicensed platforms and the significant social and security risks for users. Unlicensed ride-hailing platforms would expose users to multiple risks, including the absence of liability in case of accidents or safety-related issues, non-compliance with quality standards, and a lack of tracking and insurance coverage. Furthermore, such illegal operations are said to undermine fair competition and would reduce the revenue of law-abiding, licensed companies, negatively impacting the local economy.

Working for unlicensed ride-hailing platforms in Jordan constitutes a violation of Article 24 of the Traffic Law, with penalties, including vehicle impoundment and imprisonment, imposed on individuals who use private vehicles for commercial transport.<sup>22</sup> That said, workers and customers can download unlicensed platforms through VPNs to continue to use them. According to Article 6 of the Regulation, workers are not allowed to be older than 65 years and the vehicle must be owned by the driver or a second-degree relative. Specifying the vehicle requirements further, Article 7 states that the operational span of the vehicle must not be older than seven years, starting from the year of manufacture. In addition, insurance is required, with the mandatory liability coverage in accordance with the Motor Vehicle Compulsory Insurance System and supplementary liability insurance exceeding the mandatory coverage. The LTRC has also issued fare-related instructions under this regulation, setting ride-hailing fares at 0.35 Jordanian Dinar per kilometer, 15% above the standard yellow taxi meter fare.<sup>23</sup>

Each licensed platform is required to pay the LTRC an annual fee of JOD 100,000 (USD 141,046), allowing 3,000 vehicles to be registered. Any additional permit costs JOD 70 per vehicle. Ride-hailing workers must also pay JOD 400 (USD 564) annually themselves for the operation permit. If a driver wishes to work on multiple platforms simultaneously, they must pay an additional JOD 20 (USD 28) per platform annually.

The Telecommunications Regulatory Commission regulates work in the food delivery services. However, there are no specific laws, regulations, or official guidelines governing this work, despite the large numbers of workers. As a result, workers are not required to obtain official licenses from the government, and their working conditions are mainly regulated by the companies operating the delivery platforms or by the restaurants that employ them.

### Current State and Future Outlook

The government began to gradually address platform workers' demands in 2025. In April, it announced that the LTRC would be tasked with implementing electronic integration with platform systems, updating licensing and work permit regulations, improving complaint mechanisms, and setting standards for financial solvency, service quality, and compliance. Additionally, the government is exploring the possibility of allowing drivers to voluntarily enroll in social security and is seeking to regulate the relationship between platform companies and app-based drivers to ensure fairness for both sides.<sup>24</sup>


Recent amendments to the regulations further envision that new companies can obtain licenses to encourage investment, enhance competitiveness, and reduce the number of unlicensed platforms.<sup>25</sup> Prior, the approval of new licenses was prohibited. The amendments also obligate companies to establish clear wage and commission structures (service fees) approved by the LTRC and to sign binding contracts for data-sharing and electronic integration with the Commission. Companies are also required to fulfill a quota of vehicles that cater to the needs of people with disabilities, provide promotional offers to drivers, establish a complaint and feedback system, maintain records of complaints and their resolution, and provide a well-equipped training center for driver qualification and capacity-building.

While many of these amendments have been welcomed by most drivers, others criticize the decision not to extend the operational age limit of vehicles to ten years.<sup>26</sup> According to our correspondence with the Deputy Head of the Volunteer Committee for App Captains, this may prove a financial burden for the thousands of Jordanian families who are dependent on this work. He explained that drivers are unable to pay off their vehicle loans within such a short period, especially since most vehicles are financed through banks. Failure to extend the operational age could therefore lead to loan defaults and even imprisonment for some drivers. The drivers committee also criticized the government's decision not to reduce the work permit fee from JOD 400 (USD 564) to JOD 200 (USD 282).



## SCORES

### FAIRWORK Jordan Scores 2025



The breakdown of scores for individual platforms is available at:  
**FAIR.WORK/JORDAN**

## EXPLAINING THE SCORES

### Principle 1: Fair pay

Platforms that ensure that workers are paid at least the local minimum wage can obtain a point under the first threshold, and an additional point for the second threshold if they demonstrate that they provide a living wage after work-related expenses.

We could not find evidence that any of the platforms could ensure that workers earn above the local minimum wage of JOD 1.40 (USD 1.97) per hour. This is due to the high expenses associated with platform work in Jordan. Costs include the commission to the platforms, the permit (ride-hailing only), fuel, repair costs, internet, tickets, and fines. However, car loans represent the main cost, binding workers to continue working with the platforms in order to pay off their loans. Waiting time between gigs is unpaid. The workers we spoke to reported that these work-associated costs make up half of their income or more. For some workers, the costs outweigh their incomes, resulting in negative wages.

Considering that no platform could score a point for principle 1.1 on minimum wages, none of the platforms received a point under principle 1.2 on living wages. We couldn't find evidence that workers earn a guaranteed living wage with a net hourly pay of JOD 3.05 (USD 4.30) per hour.

### Principle 2: Fair conditions

Platforms can score the first point on this principle if there is sufficient evidence to show that they take active measures to mitigate work-related health and safety risks, for example, by providing adequate equipment and training at no additional cost to the worker. Platforms can score the second point if there is evidence that they provide a social safety net for workers, compensating them for income loss due to the inability to work.

The first point of this principle concerns safety measures provided by the platform. We could find no evidence that this was met by any of the platforms. We found that most platforms provide an emergency or SOS button to connect workers with the local authorities in case of an accident or injury, however, the support doesn't appear to extend more than the immediate help. Our evidence shows that workers are often not compensated for their ongoing trip in which an emergency happened; the only support from the platform we could evidence is that customers are matched with a new driver to finish the trip or delivery. Additionally, we have no evidence that workers are protected from or have the chance to report incidents of threats, harassment, and illicit activities by customers. It is noteworthy that interviewed workers across all platforms complained about some sort of difficulty, either physical, mental, or social, as a result of working on platforms.

The second point concerns the workers' security net, including social security. None of the platforms could show that they provide workers with social security, and none of the platforms was awarded a point. We found that a few workers were enrolled in social security schemes through their main job or voluntarily. However, a few workers also reported that they had to stop their voluntary subscription, as they couldn't afford it anymore. Further, if workers are unable to work for an extended period, their platform ratings are negatively affected, which impacts their income capacity.

### Principle 3: Fair contracts

For platforms to score on this threshold, they must demonstrate that the contract or terms and conditions are clear and accessible to all workers and do not include unfair terms.

Two platforms, Petra Ride and Jeeny, were awarded the first point for fair contracts. These two platforms could show that they provide accessible contracts that are subject to the local law.

None of the platforms met the second point, as they could not prove that they don't impose any unfair working conditions. Risks and liability lie solely with the workers. We have no evidence that any of the platforms notify their workers about changes in their terms and conditions ahead of time<sup>27</sup>. Workers we spoke to reported that they were informed a day or two before the changes are implemented. However, most workers told us they find out about changes in conditions after they have already been implemented. Unexpected changes in the contract conditions which happen to the detriment of workers across different platforms include such things as lowered fares or altered payment structures.

### Principle 4: Fair management

To score the first point for this principle, platforms must demonstrate that workers are not arbitrarily deactivated and that there is a documented process for workers to meaningfully appeal disciplinary actions. To score the second point, platforms must evidence that they have a policy in place to prevent discrimination against workers, as well as measures to promote the participation of marginalised groups and to make the work allocation criteria transparent to workers. None of the platforms could meet the criteria for the first point.

Concerning quality of the communication channels, this differs per platform. For example, workers at Careem can reach the platform through call centres, chatbots, and by email. Careem does not appear to provide a clear time frame for processing of workers' requests; however, the workers we spoke to noted that Careem's communication is more timely than other platforms. Uber workers complained that there is no call centre, and that Uber can only be reached by email.

Workers further criticised the slow response rate. Additionally, workers who joined the platform more recently didn't know how to reach Uber. None of the platforms could evidence that they provide documented appeal processes. These should be available to workers even after their accounts have been deactivated.

The second point, equity in the management process, could also not be awarded to any of the platforms. We found no evidence that platforms actively promote diversity and equity principles. Similarly, we could not find proof that platforms protect workers from discrimination. It appears that workers are discriminated against by the algorithm, based on the type of vehicle they drive; those with older or non-electric cars get fewer high-fare trips and thus lower income.

### Principle 5: Fair representation

For platforms to score on this principle, platforms should ensure freedom of association and the expression of collective worker voice.

Due to Jordan's legal framework, platform workers, such as ride-hailers and delivery drivers, are not allowed to unionise. Platforms do not recognise the informal arrangement of workers via social media. As such, there's no evidence of any documented mechanism for the expression of collective worker voice by any of the platforms. None of the platforms published any formal, written statement of willingness to recognise and bargain with a collective, independent body of workers or trade union. Therefore, none of the platforms was awarded this point.



### IN FOCUS:

## Workers' Stories

**Khalid\*** is 28 years old and graduated with a bachelor's degree in physiotherapy. While he works irregularly in his profession, he supplements his income by working six to seven hours a day on ride-hailing platforms. He works mainly with Jeeny, and bridges waiting times by working additionally with Petra Ride and Taxi-F.

He enjoys the flexibility of platform work, and that he can work or take a day off depending on his schedule. However, he does not always take days off. He also explains the downsides of working specifically with Jeeny. For example, he says that the way trips get distributed among the drivers is unfair and leads to malpractices concerning road safety. He explains that all drivers close to a customer who requests a trip get notified of the trip. Whomever accepts it first, gets it. This means Khalid keeps his phone in his hand while driving. He goes on to tell us that he receives around JOD 400-500 (USD 564- 705) in traffic fines each year, for (repeatedly) holding the phone and speeding. He wishes there was a better structure how trips are distributed, similarly to other applications: *"If the system assigned the request directly to a driver, it would be more convenient. Apps like Taxi F, for example, send the request directly to you, and you have 10 seconds to accept, while Jeeny gives about 30 seconds. But at least with Taxi F, you know the request is yours, so you don't need to rush and risk causing an accident."*

While he earns around JOD 400 (USD 564) monthly from his physiotherapy job, his job in ride-hailing is less lucrative. Like many other drivers he considers the regulation on the operational life span for his car as too short. His private car was older than five years, and thus, he had to purchase a new car to start working on the platforms, meaning he had to take out a loan for a new car. Having to pay off this loan every month significantly reduces his income, in addition to other associated costs: *"Car licensing, fuel, and instalment fees must be deducted from my income. Most new drivers finance their cars through companies that charge a 9% interest rate, with a monthly instalment of JOD 400 (USD 564) or more. My personal instalment is JOD 350 (USD 494). So, if my income is JOD 600 (USD 846), after deducting JOD 350 (USD 494) for the car instalment, I'm left with JOD 250 (USD 353). But then there are maintenance costs and accidents, plus licensing and fines, so in reality, if I calculate everything, I end up in the red regardless of the app."* Khalid likes that Jeeny compensates him when a customer doesn't pay within two to three hours. Especially during night shifts, he prefers not to argue over non-payment with customers and instead requests compensation. Payments that are processed via Visa, do not immediately reach him: *"That's a major issue. On a given day, I might earn 25-30 JOD (USD 35-42), with more than half coming through Visa, but I can't access that money directly—it gets deducted from commissions. I still need cash when I go home, but the company only processes payouts on Sundays. They've started doing it more frequently, but if there's a holiday, there's no transfer. Other apps like Klik send the money immediately, even with a commission, which would be fine—but at least you get paid."*

Khalid encountered numerous difficult situations with customers, especially working at night: *“I often pick up intoxicated passengers, drug users, or even people carrying weapons. I’ve been in many dangerous situations, but thankfully, things always resolve themselves in the moment, and I make sure to get paid for the ride.”* He stresses that the companies do not protect workers sufficiently against these risks; instead, workers have to be creative to feel safe executing their work. *“All apps are the same—anyone working in this field is exposed to these risks. We have a captains’ emergency group, which is extremely useful. If anything happens, we send our location immediately, and all the drivers come to help. This is especially valuable for those working at night. In the daytime, there’s little need for it, but at night, it’s crucial. The companies themselves have no involvement in this—it’s something we created on our own.”*

He voiced his frustration with us, that there is a lack of oversight and competition in Jordan’s platform economy. Neither platform companies nor public authorities respond to workers’ concerns. Since Uber and Careem are in fact the same company, only operating under different entities, they monopolise the ride-hailing sector, which limits the bargaining power of workers. The current licensing procedure reinforces the dependency by linking the license to one of these platforms, rather than granting individual or independent licenses. Subsequently, workers risk losing their livelihood if a platform deactivates a worker’s account, despite having paid a governmental licensing fee. He concludes: *“There’s no protection for drivers!”*



**Mohammad\*** is 26 years old, and he works on Talabat, a food delivery platform. His main job is cleaning in the city of Zarqa, located in the governorate next to Amman, where he lives. He works as a driver with Talabat as a side job to supplement his income. He drives around thirty minutes to Amman, since the job opportunities are better in the capital. Usually, he works between six and twelve hours a day. While he is glad to secure a daily income that is above the minimum wage, he also admits that it is low.

Talabat operates in a shift system where workers pick their shifts according to their ratings. For one shift, Mohammad needs to work minimally for four hours straight. During this time, he needs to accept orders, either manually or by turning on auto-accept; otherwise, his ratings drop. He told us, *“If I take a break, my rating drops. When I went to the office to ask how to improve my rating, they told me not to take breaks, never be late to customers, show up early for my shift, and work during peak hours.”* Having a high rating is important for him and other workers at Talabat, since it affects their earnings. Those with the highest rank earn an extra JOD 0.10 (USD 0.14) per order and can pick their shifts ahead of others. Mohammad is ranked third, meaning he books his shift one day after rank two workers book their shift, and two days after rank one workers book their shift. He finds it very difficult to increase his rank; *“you have to sacrifice your comfort, avoid breaks, and never be late.”*

He finds this shift system very tough and struggles with getting suitable shifts. Additionally, *“If a captain misses a shift for a day or two, they might block them for three days. If a captain is late delivering to a customer, they might block them. If there’s an issue with a customer—just a normal misunderstanding—Talabat always sides with the customer rather than the captain, and they don’t show any leniency in such situations. That’s a serious downside for me.”* Further, some sudden changes in the exemption policy increased the costs for workers: *“Previously, if an order spilt during delivery—like coffee with weak packaging—the company would cover the cost. Now, the captain has to bear the expense if the customer refuses to accept it.”* Another issue raised by Mohammad is the way rates are calculated, namely based on direct distance rather than ground distance. This means that the actual time to deliver the order is longer than calculated by Talabat, and thus the fare is lower than what it actually should be.

In such cases, workers can reach out to Talabat – either through a call centre or in person. However, Mohammad finds the service of the call centre poor. The call centre is based in Egypt with Egyptian staff, making it hard to communicate: *“There should be a Jordanian team handling support.”*

\* All worker names have been changed to ensure the confidentiality of the participants.

## THEME IN FOCUS

# Structural Pressure on Platform Workers

**Market concentration, with Uber and Careem dominating the ride-hailing sector, unfair regulation, and high operational costs, trap workers in cycles of debt and precarity – all while maintaining the façade of flexibility and autonomy associated with their “self-employed” status.**

On its surface, platform work attracts workers with the promise of convenient digital labour and a fast or easy way to earn money. However, structures amplified by the platforms themselves and the regulatory authorities reveal that workers are exposed to (financial) precarity. Workers are structurally pressured by: 1) market concentration and monopoly of the main platforms, 2) high costs, and 3) lack of legal protection.

Those who wish to work in ride-hailing purchase their license with either Careem or Uber as the premium platforms. If someone wants to work with other platforms, licenses for those can be purchased for JOD 20 (USD 28) in addition to the main license for JOD 400 (USD 564). However, following Uber’s acquisition of Careem in 2020, the market got consolidated; the monopoly in the ride-hailing sector limits workers’ options and fair market competition. The monopoly reduces workers’ bargaining power; they cannot negotiate fares, commissions, or terms. Workers have advocated for more companies to be licensed, to increase market competition; this has recently been achieved. The outcome of the new regulations and their impact on workers’ wages will have to be assessed in the future.

While workers pay annually a total of minimum JOD 4.4 million (USD 6.2 million) in licensing fees to the LTRC, they receive little in return: no subsidies, adjustments of licensing policies, or improvements in oversight. Workers must cover all costs associated with their work: fuel, maintenance, fines, and permit fees. To comply with the operational age limit, workers may have to take out loans to purchase new cars. Often, workers’ family members act as loan guarantors, spreading the financial risk across the household.

A spokesperson for the ride-hailers explained to us that many people who want to work in ride-hailing can’t afford to purchase brand new cars and thus opt for vehicles manufactured two or three years ago.<sup>28</sup> With the operational age dating seven years and loan repayment averaging six years, drivers face the risk of completing their payments just as their vehicles become ineligible for work, while others with a slightly older car might not be able to finish paying off their loans on time.


This mismatch between loan terms and regulatory standards leaves many workers in a cycle of debt and financial strain. In the beginning, the commission rates were much lower (around 7-10%), and the loans were easier to pay off. However, with an increase in the commission rates (up to 30%), this became much harder. Many workers that we interviewed are indebted to their banks, creating financial pressure. To keep paying off their loans, they are forced to continue working on platforms. Workers’ collectives successfully advocated for raising the retirement age for captains from 60 to 65. This has been an important demand, since some captains who are still paying off car loans would have otherwise been forced to stop working and search for opportunities in Jordan’s strained job market. Drivers have called for either extending the maximum operational age of vehicles to ten years or allowing cars to remain eligible for seven years from the date of registration on the platform, rather than from the manufacturing date.

These high operational and regulatory costs have led to negative wages in some instances. To compensate for low net incomes, drivers work longer hours or take more risks, such as driving faster to complete more trips. The trip allocation system, “who clicks the fastest, gets the trip”, results in many workers constantly holding and checking their phones, further exacerbating risk-taking behaviour among drivers and thus endangering road safety.

The oversight of the working conditions in the platform economy is weak and doesn’t extend much beyond licensing caps. Platforms control pricing, commissions, blocks, and other penalties without transparency. Workers face arbitrary blocking without appeal mechanisms – neither with the platforms, nor with the authorities. The 2018 clause of the Regulation that requires electronic integration between platforms and the LTRC remains unimplemented. Both drivers and the LTRC officials have called for a digital system to track fare violations, blocks, and appeals. During our fieldwork, a key informant told us that the lack of oversight has even led to a scenario where unlicensed workers work on a licensed platform (Jeeny).<sup>29</sup> According to our fieldwork, we found that Jeeny’s number of permits granted is substantially lower than the premium platforms, about 750 compared to 5,750 for Uber and 5,750 for Careem. This unbalanced distribution of permits and the refusal of the government to increase the license cap has encouraged platforms to register workers on their platform without governmental licenses, to increase their driver base and stay competitive against the major platforms. Workers might prefer to work without licenses on Jeeny, since the fares are too low to cover their costs. Further, Jeeny deducts sales tax from these unlicensed captains; taxes which are supposed to be borne by the companies and supposed to go to the government, but don’t.

The labour law does not apply to platform workers, as they are not subordinated to the platforms and can control their working hours and choose the requested rides they fulfil. However, the work status of captains could also be considered blurred; the contracts between workers and platforms are non-negotiable, and thus platforms stay in control over fares, commission, penalties, and incentives. With the platforms not holding accountability, considering their workers to be service providers rather than employees, platform workers lack legal protection.

In conclusion, the structure of Jordan's ride-hailing sector, namely monopolised, financially burdensome, and lacking monitoring and legal accountability, undermines the promise of flexible employment. These issues need to be addressed, if the best interests of Jordanians, both customers and drivers, are to be respected. As a spokesperson of the captains told us: *"Any updated laws or regulations must protect public interest—not just serve companies."*



## MOVING FORWARD

# Pathways of Change

Fairwork's theory of change relies on a humanist belief in the power of empathy and knowledge. If they have the economic means to choose, many consumers will be discerning about the platform services they use. Our yearly ratings give consumers the ability to choose the highest scoring platform operating in a sector, thus contributing to pressure on platforms to improve their working conditions and their scores. In this way, we leverage consumer solidarity with workers' allies in the fight for fairer working conditions. Beyond individual consumer choices, our scores can help inform the procurement, investment and partnership policies of large organisations. They can serve as a reference for institutions and companies who want to ensure they are supporting fair labour practices. In this regard, we see four pathways to change.




Figure 2: Fairwork's Pathways to Change

Our fieldwork data, combined with feedback from workshops and consultations involving workers, informs how we systematically evolve the Fairwork principles to remain in line with their needs. There is nothing inevitable about poor working conditions in the platform economy. Despite their claims to the contrary, platforms have substantial control over the nature of the jobs that they mediate. Workers who find their jobs through platforms are ultimately workers, and there is no basis for denying them the key rights and protections that their counterparts in the formal sector have long enjoyed. Our scores show that the platform economy, as we know it today, already takes many forms, with some platforms displaying greater concern for workers' needs than others. This means that we do not accept low pay, poor conditions, inequity, and a lack of agency and voice as the norm. We hope that our work – by highlighting the contours of today's platform economy – paints a picture of what it could become.

### Stakeholder engagement

**Platforms:** The first and most direct pathway to improve the working conditions in the digital labour platforms is by engaging directly with the platforms. The Fairwork Jordan team reached out to the platform managers of the assessed platforms, however, only Taxi-F and Petra Ride agreed to meet with us. They provided us with additional information on their business model and how they consider their drivers' safety and working conditions. Taxi-F showed willingness to explore adjustments, based on this year's report. These include: fare adjustments to protect workers from falling below a minimum benchmark, safety-net schemes for exclusive drivers, and independent workers council / representatives for a regular dialogue with workers. In a next step, we welcome documented evidence from the platform to show that they will implement these changes.

**Policy Makers and the Government:** The Fairwork Jordan team also engaged with policy makers and the Jordanian government to advocate for decent working conditions. We've met with the LTRC, Ministry of Labour, and a legal expert. In parallel with our fieldwork and subsequent analysis, the LTRC discussed and agreed on the amendments to the ride-hailing policies as demanded by the workers. The main objective of further licensing the platform economy is a welcome step to improving working conditions. However, workers' demands regarding personalised licenses, costs of licenses, and increasing the operational age limit of vehicles are yet to be implemented. To ensure quality and safety for customers, the LTRC will keep to the seven-year operational life span of vehicles, but added during our fieldwork that there might be a compromise for well-maintained vehicles. The LTRC is open to setting up inspection centres, and may grant one- or two-year extensions if a car is in good condition. Regarding the reduction of fees, the LTRC emphasised during our meeting with them that this matter is out of their mandate as it is tied to national budgets and fiscal planning, as the revenue from the licenses goes to the Ministry of Finance. However, the LTRC is positive that the new regulations might offer room for instalment plans between companies and drivers. Lastly, the LTRC emphasised that there is a need for more insight and electronic integration of data, such as pricing, fare structures, and blocks in order to resolve disputes between companies and workers more fairly. Digital monitoring of these affairs requires closer collaboration between the platforms and the authorities.

**Platform Workers and Organised Labour:** Through our fieldwork, we consulted workers to explore possible pathways of change. Along the five dimensions of fair work, we explored the possible needs of workers as discussed earlier. The result of it is the current assessment of platforms in Jordan. In addition to this collaboration, workers are organising themselves in informal ways, using social media, to support each other and unionise. They collaborate to organise sit-ins and strikes, share GPSs with each other, call for support where needed, or educate new workers on platform policies. Workers may choose to use the Fairwork reports to make their struggles visible, however, more structured support and processes for feedback and bargaining are needed.

**Consumers and Civil Society:** Civil society organisations and the media can play a crucial role in raising awareness about working conditions in the platform economy, and pressure the government and platforms to listen to the workers' demands.



## The Fairwork Pledge

As part of this process of change, we have introduced the Fairwork pledge. This pledge leverages the power of organisations' procurement, investment, and partnership policies to support fairer platform work. Organisations like universities, schools, businesses, and charities who make use of platform labour can make a difference by supporting best labour practices, guided by our five principles of fair work. Organisations who sign the pledge get to display our badge on company organisational materials.

The pledge constitutes two levels. This first is as an official Fairwork Supporter, which entails publicly demonstrating support for fairer platform work, and making resources available to staff and members to help them in deciding which platforms to engage with. A second level of the pledge entails organisations committing to concrete and meaningful changes in their own practices as official Fairwork Partners, for example by committing to using better-rated platforms where there is a choice.

**MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE  
PLEDGE, AND HOW TO SIGN UP,  
IS AVAILABLE AT  
[FAIR.WORK/PLEDGE](https://fair.work/pledge)**




## APPENDIX

### Fairwork Scoring System

#### Which companies are covered by the Fairwork principles?

The ILO defines a “digital labour platform” as an enterprise that mediates and facilitates “labour exchange between different users, such as businesses, workers and consumers”.<sup>[i]</sup> That includes digital labour “marketplaces” where “businesses set up the tasks and requirements and the platforms match these to a global pool of workers who can complete the tasks within the specified time”.<sup>[ii]</sup> Marketplaces that do not facilitate labour exchanges - for example, Airbnb (which matches owners of accommodation with those seeking to rent short term accommodation) and eBay (which matches buyers and sellers of goods) are obviously excluded from the definition. The ILO’s definition of “digital labour platform” is widely accepted and includes many different business models.<sup>[iii]</sup>

Fairwork’s research covers digital labour platforms that fall within this definition that aim to connect individual service providers with consumers of the service through the platform interface. Fairwork’s research does not cover platforms that mediate offers of employment between individuals and employers (whether on a long-term or on a temporary basis).



Fairwork distinguishes between two types of these platforms. The first, is ‘geographically tethered’ platforms where the work is required to be done in a particular location such as delivering food from a restaurant to an apartment, driving a person from one part of town to another or cleaning. These are often referred to as ‘gig work platforms’. The second is ‘cloudwork’ platforms where the work can, in theory, be performed from any location via the internet.

The thresholds for meeting each principle are different for location-based and cloudwork platforms because location-based work platforms can be benchmarked against local market factors, risks/harms, and regulations that apply in that country, whereas cloudwork platforms cannot because (by their nature) the work can be performed from anywhere and so different market factors, risks/harms, and regulations apply depending on where the work is performed.

The platforms covered by Fairwork’s research have different business, revenue and governance models including employment-based, subcontractor, commission-based, franchise, piece-rate, shift-based, subscription models. Some of those models involve the platforms making direct payments to workers (including through sub-contractors).

[i] International Labour Organisation. (2021) World Employment and Social Outlook: The role of digital labour platforms in transforming the world of work. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. p. 31. Available at: [https://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/2021/WCMS\\_771749/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/2021/WCMS_771749/lang--en/index.htm) . (Accessed: 28 September 2023).

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] De Stefano, V. (2016) The rise of the ‘just-in-time workforce’: On-demand work, crowdwork and labour protection in the ‘gig-economy’. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. p. 1. Available at: [https://www.ilo.org/travail/info/publications/WCMS\\_443267/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/travail/info/publications/WCMS_443267/lang--en/index.htm). (Accessed: 28 September 2023).



## How does the scoring system work?

The five Principles of Fairwork were developed through an extensive literature review of published research on job quality, stakeholder meetings at UNCTAD and the ILO in Geneva (involving platform operators, policymakers, trade unions, and academics), and in-country meetings with local stakeholders.

Each Fairwork Principle is divided into two points. Accordingly, for each Principle, the scoring system allows the first to be awarded corresponding to the first threshold, and an additional second point to be awarded corresponding to the second threshold (see Table 1). The second point under each Principle can only be awarded if the first point for that Principle has been awarded. The thresholds specify the evidence required for a platform to receive a given point. Where no verifiable evidence is available that meets a given threshold, the platform is not awarded that point.

A platform can therefore receive a maximum Fairwork score of 10 points. Fairwork scores are updated on a yearly basis; the scores presented in this report were derived from data pertaining to the 11 months between September 2024 to August 2025 and are valid until September 2026.

Principle	First Point	Second Point	Total
<b>Principle 1 Fair Pay</b>	Ensures workers earn at least the local minimum wage after costs	Ensures workers earn at least a local living wage after costs	2
<b>Principle 2 Fair Conditions</b>	Mitigates task-specific risks	Ensures safe working conditions and a safety net	2
<b>Principle 3 Fair Contracts</b>	Provides clear and transparent terms and conditions	Ensures that no unfair contract terms are imposed	2
<b>Principle 4 Fair Management</b>	Provides due process for decisions affecting workers	Provides equity in the management process	2
<b>Principle 5 Fair Representation</b>	Assures freedom of association and the expression of worker voice	Supports democratic governance	2

Maximum possible Fairwork Score:





**“The labour law does not apply to platform workers, as they are not subordinated to the platforms and can control their working hours and choose the requested rides they fulfil. However, the work status of captains could also be considered blurred; the contracts between workers and platforms are non-negotiable, and thus platforms stay in control over fares, commission, penalties, and incentives. With the platforms not holding accountability, considering their workers to be service providers rather than employees, platform workers lack legal protection.”**



## **Principle 1:**

### **Fair Pay**

1.1 - Ensures workers earn at least the local minimum wage after costs (one point).

Platform workers often have substantial work-related costs to cover, such as transport between jobs, supplies, or fuel, insurance, and maintenance on a vehicle.<sup>[i]</sup> Workers' costs sometimes mean their take-home earnings may fall below the local minimum wage.<sup>[ii]</sup> Workers also absorb the costs of extra time commitment, when they spend time waiting or travelling between jobs, or other unpaid activities necessary for their work, such as mandatory training, which are also considered active hours.<sup>[iii]</sup> To achieve this point platforms must ensure that work-related costs do not push workers below local minimum wage.

The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure both of the following:

- Payment must be on time and in-full.
- Workers earn at least the local minimum wage, or the wage set by collective sectoral agreement (whichever is higher) in the place where they work, in their active hours, after costs.<sup>[iv]</sup>

1.2 - Ensures workers earn at least a local living wage after costs (one additional point)

In some places, the minimum wage is not enough to allow workers to afford a basic but decent standard of living. To achieve this point platforms must ensure that work-related costs do not push workers below local living wage. The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure the following:

- Workers earn at least a local living wage, or the wage set by collective sectoral agreement (whichever is higher) in the place where they work, in their active hours, after costs.<sup>[v][vi]</sup>

## **Principle 2:**

### **Fair Conditions**

2.1 – Mitigates task-specific risks (one point)

Platform workers may encounter a number of risks in the course of their work, including accidents and injuries, harmful materials, and crime and violence. To achieve this point platforms must show that they are aware of these risks and take basic steps to mitigate them.

The platform must satisfy the following:

- Adequate equipment and training are provided to protect workers' health and safety from task-specific risks.<sup>[vii]</sup> These should be implemented at no additional cost to the worker.
- The platform mitigates the risks of lone working by providing adequate support and designing processes with occupational safety and health in mind.
- Platforms take meaningful steps to ensure that workers do not suffer significant costs as a result of accident, injury or disease resulting from work.

## 2.2 - Ensures safe working conditions and a safety net (one additional point)

Platform workers are vulnerable to the possibility of abruptly losing their income as the result of unexpected or external circumstances, such as, for example, sickness, or parenthood. Most countries provide a social safety net to ensure workers don't experience sudden poverty due to circumstances outside their control.<sup>[viii]</sup> However, platform workers usually don't qualify for protections such as sick pay, because of their independent contractor status. In recognition of the fact that most workers are dependent on income they earn from platform work, platforms should ensure that workers are compensated for loss of income due to inability to work. In addition, platforms must minimise the risk of sickness and injury even when all the basic steps have been taken.

The platform must satisfy ALL of the following:

- Platform takes meaningful steps towards the social protection of its workers.
- Where workers are unable to work for an extended period due to unexpected circumstances, their standing on the platform is not negatively impacted.
- The platform implements policies or practices that protect workers' safety from task-specific risks. In particular, the platform should ensure that pay is not structured in a way that incentivizes workers to take excessive levels of risk.

## Principle 3:

### Fair Contracts

#### 3.1 - Provides clear and transparent terms and conditions (one point)

The terms and conditions governing platform work are not always clear and accessible to workers.<sup>[ix]</sup> To achieve this point, the platform must demonstrate

that workers are able to understand, agree to, and access the conditions of their work at all times and that they have legal recourse if the other party breaches those conditions.

The platform must satisfy ALL of the following:

- The party contracting with the worker must be identified in the contract, and subject to the law of the country/state/region in which the worker works.
- The contract/terms & conditions are presented in full in clear and comprehensible language that all workers could be expected to understand.
- Workers have to sign a contract and/or give informed consent to terms of conditions upon signing up for the platform.
- The contracts/terms and conditions are easily accessible to workers in paper form, or via the app/platform interface at all times.
- Contracts/terms & conditions do not include clauses that revert prevailing legal frameworks in the respective countries.
- Platforms take adequate, responsible and ethical data protection and management measures, laid out in a documented policy.<sup>[x]</sup>

#### 3.2 - Ensures that no unfair contract terms are imposed (one additional point)

In some cases, especially under 'independent contractor' classifications, workers carry a disproportionate amount of risk for engaging in a contract with the service user. They may be liable for any damage arising in the course of their work, and they may be prevented by unfair clauses from seeking legal redress for grievances. To achieve this point, platforms must demonstrate that risks and liability of engaging in the work is shared between parties.

Regardless of how the contractual status of the worker is classified, the platform must satisfy ALL of the following:

- Every worker is notified of proposed changes in clear and understandable language within a reasonable timeframe before changes come into effect; and the changes should not reverse existing accrued benefits and reasonable expectations on which workers have relied.
- The contract/terms and conditions neither include clauses which exclude liability for negligence nor unreasonably exempt the platform from liability for working conditions. The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure that the contract does not include clauses which prevent workers from effectively seeking redress for grievances which arise from the working relationship.
- In case platform labour is mediated by subcontractors: The platform implements a reliable mechanism to monitor and ensure that the

subcontractor is living up to the standards expected from the platform itself regarding working conditions.

- In cases where algorithms are used to determine pricing, bonuses, ratings and/or allocate jobs, the data collected, and calculations used must be transparent and documented in a form available to workers in clear and comprehensible language that all workers could be expected to understand.

## Principle 4:

### Fair Management

#### 4.1 - Provides due process for decisions affecting workers (one point)

Platform workers can experience arbitrary deactivation; being barred from accessing the platform without explanation, and potentially losing their income. Workers may be subject to other penalties or disciplinary decisions without the ability to contact the service user or the platform to challenge or appeal them if they believe they are unfair. To achieve this point, platforms must demonstrate an avenue for workers to meaningfully appeal disciplinary actions.

The platform must satisfy ALL of the following:

- There is an easily accessible channel for workers to communicate with a human representative of the platform and to effectively solve problems. This channel is documented in the contract and available on the platform interface. Platforms should respond to workers within a reasonable timeframe.
- There is a process for workers to meaningfully and effectively appeal low ratings, non-payment, payment issues, deactivations, and other penalties and disciplinary actions. This process is documented in a contract and available on the platform interface.
- In the case of deactivations, the appeals process must be available to workers who no longer have access to the platform.
- Workers are not disadvantaged for voicing concerns or appealing disciplinary actions.

#### 4.2 - Provides equity in the management process (one additional point)

The majority of platforms do not actively discriminate against particular groups of workers. However, they may inadvertently exacerbate already existing inequalities in their design and management. For example, there is a lot of gender segregation between different types of platform work. To achieve this point, platforms must show not only that they have policies against discrimination, but also that they seek to remove barriers for disadvantaged groups and promote inclusion.

Platforms must satisfy ALL of the following:

- The platform has an effective anti-discrimination policy laying out a clear process for reporting, correcting and penalising discrimination of workers on the platform on grounds such as race, social origin, caste, ethnicity, nationality, gender, sex, gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, disability, religion or belief, age or any other status.[xi]
- The platform has measures in place to promote diversity, equality and inclusion on the platform. It takes practical measures to promote equality of opportunity for workers from disadvantaged groups, including reasonable accommodation for pregnancy, disability, and religion or belief.
- Where persons from a disadvantaged group (such as women) are significantly under-represented among a pool of workers, it seeks to identify and remove barriers to access by persons from that group.
- If algorithms are used to determine access to work or remuneration or the type of work and pay scales available to workers seeking to use the platform, these are transparent and do not result in inequitable outcomes for workers from historically or currently disadvantaged groups.
- It has mechanisms to reduce the risk of users discriminating against workers from disadvantaged groups in accessing and carrying out work.

## Principle 5:

### Fair Representation

#### 5.1 - Assures freedom of association and the expression of worker voice (one point)

Freedom of association is a fundamental right for all workers, and enshrined in the constitution of the International Labour Organisation, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The right for workers to organise, collectively express their wishes – and importantly – be listened to, is an important prerequisite for fair working conditions. However, rates of organisation amongst platform workers remain low. To achieve this point, platforms must ensure that the conditions are in place to encourage the expression of collective worker voice.

Platforms must satisfy ALL of the following:

- There is a documented mechanism[xii] for the expression of collective worker voice that allows ALL workers, regardless of employment status, to participate without risks.
- There is a formal, written statement of willingness to recognise, and bargain with, a collective, independent body of workers or trade union, that is clearly communicated to all workers, and available on the platform interface.

- Freedom of association is not inhibited, and workers are not disadvantaged in any way for communicating their concerns, wishes and demands to the platform, or expressing willingness to form independent collective bodies of representation.

## 5.2 - Supports democratic governance (one additional point)

While rates of organisation remain low, platform workers' associations are emerging in many sectors and countries. We are also seeing a growing number of cooperative worker-owned platforms. To realise fair representation, workers must have a say in the conditions of their work. This could be through a democratically governed cooperative model, a formally recognised union, or the ability to undertake collective bargaining with the platform.

The platform must satisfy at least ONE of the following:

- Workers play a meaningful role in governing it.
- In a written document available at all times on the platform interface, the platform publicly and formally recognises an independent collective body of workers, an elected works council, or trade union. This recognition is not exclusive and, when the legal framework allows, the platform should recognise any significant collective body seeking representation.

[i] Work-related costs include direct costs the worker may incur in performing the job. This may include, for instance, transport in between jobs, supplies, vehicle repair and maintenance, fuel, road tolls and vehicle insurance. However, it does not include transport to and from the job (unless in-between tasks) nor taxes, social security contributions or health insurance.

[ii] The ILO defines minimum wage as the “minimum amount of remuneration that an employer is required to pay wage earners for the work performed during a given period, which cannot be reduced by collective agreement or an individual contract.” Minimum wage laws protect workers from unduly low pay and help them attain a minimum standard of living. The ILO’s Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 C135 sets the conditions and requirements of establishing minimum wages and calls upon all ratifying countries to act in accordance. Minimum wage laws exist in more than 90 per cent of the ILO member states.

[iii] In addition to direct working hours where workers are completing tasks, workers also spend time performing unpaid activities necessary for their work, such as waiting for delivery orders at restaurants and travelling between jobs and undertaking mandatory training (i.e., training activities that must be completed for workers to continue accessing work on the platform). These indirect working hours are also considered part of active hours as workers are giving this time to the platform. Thus, ‘active hours’ are defined as including both direct and indirect working hours.

[iv] In order to evidence this, where the platform is responsible for paying workers the platform must either: (a) have a documented policy that ensures the workers receive at least the local minimum wage after costs in their active hours; or (b) provide summary statistics of transaction and cost.

[v] Where a living wage does not exist, Fairwork will use the Global Living Wage Coalition’s Anker Methodology to estimate one.

[vi] In order to evidence this, where the platform is responsible for paying workers the platform must either: (a) have a documented policy that ensures the workers receive at least the local living wage after costs in their active hours; or (b) provide summary statistics of transaction and cost data evidencing all workers earn a minimum wage after costs.

[vii] The ILO recognises health and safety at work as a fundamental right. Where the platform directly engages the worker, the starting point is the ILO’s Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (C155). This stipulates that employers shall be required “so far as is reasonably practicable, the workplaces, machinery, equipment and processes under their control are safe and without risk to health”, and that “where necessary, adequate protective clothing and protective equipment [should be provided] to prevent, so far as is reasonably practicable, risk of accidents or of adverse effects on health.”

[viii] The ILO’s Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102), establishes nine classes of benefit (medical care and benefits in respect of sickness, unemployment, old age, employment injury, family, maternity, invalidity and survivors). Source: <https://webapps.ilo.org/public/english/revue/download/pdf/ghai.pdf>, p.122.

[ix] The ILO’s Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC 2006), Reg. 2.1, and the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (C189), Articles 7 and 15, serve as helpful guiding examples of adequate provisions in workers’ terms and conditions, as well as worker access to those terms and conditions.

[x] As stated in international standards, ethical data protection includes aspects such as legitimacy and lawfulness, proportionality, purpose limitation, transparency, quality, data subject’s rights (access, rectification, evaluation, erasure, and portability), accountability, and collective rights. Also, when using AI, the rights to be informed about it and to have a human interface.

[xi] In accordance with the ILO Convention No. 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation and applicable national law.

[xii] A mechanism for the expression of collective worker voice will allow workers to participate in the setting of agendas so as to be able to table issues that most concern them. This mechanism can be in physical or virtual form (e.g. online meetings) and should involve meaningful interaction (e.g. not surveys). It should also allow for ALL workers to participate in regular meetings with the management.



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## ENDNOTES

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<sup>27</sup>We consider 4 weeks to be an appropriate timeframe for announcing major changes (such as those that impact workers’ wages) to the T&Cs or contracts.

<sup>28</sup>Interview with a key-informant, July 2025.

<sup>29</sup>Interview with a key-informant (July 2025).

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